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Abstract 
 
The journey of the Indonesian government in implementing women representation policy has 
evolved. In the election of 2004, women representation policies have not mentioned the target of 
achievement for political parties. The policy only states that political parties are expected to imple-
ment gender equality in nominating candidates. Then in the year of  2009 election, the government 
had changed  the policy clause, and  states the percentage that must be achieved by political parties. 
However,  in 2004 and 2009 election only a few political parties, implemented the policy. Yet, the  
policy, which is implemented, in the 2014 election has changed. The clause of the policy became more 
distinct, for it contains sanctions which are applicable to any political parties that are not imple-
menting the policy. The present study yielding that the more distinct the policy, the more likely it 
would be complied by all participating political parties. The effect of the complying political parties 
would be the increase of women participation in politics as candidates of legislatives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Enhancing of women's political par-
ticipation program, to achieve equality 
with men, has been implemented by de-
veloped countries at 10-15 years before 
the Beijing conference, in 1995. While de-
veloping countries are implementing the 
same program, Beijing conference 
(Mussarat, Jabeen & Sajid, 2017). There 
are two methods that have been tried to 
be implemented by applying quotas in the 
constitution or legislation and quotas 
through policy, which are implemented in 
political parties (Rahmatunnisa, 2016). 
Indonesia as one of the countries 
that have agreed in the Beijing confer-
ence, implement it through the policy of 
women representation. This policy has 
been implemented for three election peri-
ods. The first implementation was in the 
election of  2004, then in  the election of 
2009, and finally the policy was imple-
mented in the election of 2014. During the 
three election periods, there has been an 
evolution of women's representation poli-
cy clause. 
When the policy was implemented  
for the first time, the clause only stated, 
that a political party could  nominate 
woemn as candidates.  But  this policy 
was so weak and  has no power, to force 
all political parties to recruit women  as 
candidates. The articles of this  policy 
were not  clearly, there were no infor-
mation  about the  percentage of women 
to be recruited. As a result, not all political 
parties which  participated in the 2004 
elections  implemented the policy. The 
government then changed the policy and 
showing the percentage of women candi-
dates which must be achieved by political 
parties. But  unfortunately not all political 
parties are triggered to achieve the  target 
of  30% quota of women legislative candi-
dates. Then when the 2014 election will 
be held, the election commission inter-
preted the policy and regulate  PKPU No 
7/2013, which contains the  clause of 
sanctions.   Since then, the PKPU No. 
7/2013  becomes the trigger of political 
parties in realizing the quota of 30% of 
women candidates.  
The implementation of women rep-
resentation has drawn more interests for 
researchers. The gender quota has been 
implemented worldwide and become a 
fast track for enhanching the women rep-
resentation . This policy have been en-
hanched women representation in the 
Polish parliament  (Gwiazda, 2016). This 
policy has also been implemented in vari-
ous countries and has succeeded in in-
creasing women's representation. 
This women representation  policy 
would empower women not only in par-
liaments, but they could also ensure their 
positions in political parties, state com-
mittees and government offices at a cer-
tain percentage  (Rosen, 2017). Although 
when the quota policy is fully implement-
ed, it would threaten the reigning rules, 
practices and norms of political life, long 
premised upon women is exclusion 
(Krook, 2014). 
Meanwhile, the gender quota policy 
would be successfully implemented, if 
there are some factors like  the distinct 
and clear regulations, politics education, 
women empowerment, public campaign 
through media, mobilization of women 
movement networks, and politics educa-
tion which eliminates any ideological and 
cultural constraints for women to be ac-
tively involved in public. Yet, it has been 
found that the implementation of women 
representation was hindered by the socie-
tal culture. Kang states in his study that 
bahwa the policy implementation is also 
constrained by the patriarchy culture 
(Kang, 2013). Furthermore, Ndirangu also 
indicates that the patriarchal structure 
within parties, state and people lives has 
a deleterious influence on the level of 
women’s political participation and this  
hinges on the fact that despite the two-
thirds gender rule the representation of 
women in leadership position was low 
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(Ndirangu, 2017).  Cultural aspects as a 
constraint in political parties have also 
occurred by O’Brien & Piscopo, who state 
that “Institutional, organizational and 
structural barriers – such as masculine 
cultures and male – dominated political 
parties – limit women’s abilities to exer-
cise their talents and qualifica-
tions” (O’Brien and Piscopo, 2017). 
Therefore, it is vital for the policy 
implementers to understand to the deep 
about the political landscape in which so-
cial and political actors operate as a con-
stantly shifting field of action both contex-
tually and temporally is very important 
(Cornwall , 2017). That the societal cul-
ture is hard to change, Paxton in his study 
mentions one possible thing to be done, 
which is to make the policy more effective 
through changes in the norms that rule 
the women participation in politics 
(Paxton, 2015). This statement, however, 
has been argued by Bjarnegard by stating 
that activating regulations would only 
make the political parties better at imple-
menting the letter of the law, and they do 
not get more women elected (Bjarnegard, 
2016). 
The statements by experts in their 
studies indicates that the women repre-
sentation which is known as the quota 
law is very significant. Recruitment of 
women candidates is done by implement-
ing quota policy. Despite this, the imple-
mentation of women representation poli-
cy is not yet effective as it is hindered by 
the patriarchy culture. Therefore, to make 
its implementation more sound and effec-
tive, it is vital to conduct reconstruction 
towards the societal culture. Another pos-
sible attempt is to create regulations con-
taining norms aimed to enhance women 
participation. Yet, the political parties 
have only succeeded to implement the 
policy without actually increasing the 
number of women participation in poli-
tics. Therefore, based on the explanation 
stated in the statements seemingly the 
implemented policy  without  any sanc-
tion clause has not been distinct enough 
to push the political parties to achieve the 
target of the policy.  
Administratively, the implemented 
policy clause has included a manual con-
taining instructions for the political par-
ties. How the political parties implement 
the policy is highly dependent on the 
clause. Unless the policy clause is distinct, 
the political parties would tend to disobey 
it. Moreover, if the policy clause is dis-
tinct, coupled with sanctions, it is as-
sumed that the political parties would 
comply with the policy, making a way to 
the achievement of the policy target. 
So this article will discuss the evolu-
tionary journey of women's representa-
tion policy in Indonesia, through micro 
research in Jember District. This micro 
study argues that patriarchal culture is 
not a barrier for women to participate as 
candidates, if there is a policy which guar-
antees for the role of women in politics.  
RESEARCH METHODS 
This research article was held in 
Jember, Indonesia. This research uses 
descriptive qualitative method and 
sources of data are the political parties 
officials, the electoral commission district 
of Jember, the women candidates  which  
involved in the implementation of women 
political representation policy. Data 
collection method used is  indepth 
interviews,  and documentation. Data 
were analyzed using descriptive 
qualitative method. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The Evolution of Women Representa-
tion Policy in Indonesia 
Since the signing of the agreement 
on the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CEDAW) on 18 De-
cember 1979 and its implementation on 
September 3, 1981 and the conduct of 
Beijing Declaration, and Platform for Ac-
Available Online at http://journal.unismuh.ac.id/index.php/otoritas 
Otoritas : Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan, 8 (1),  April, 2018, 35 
Copyright © 2018, Otoritas : Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan, ISSN: 2088-3706 (Print), ISSN: 2502-9320 (Online)  
tion in 1995, the Indonesian government 
is trying to implement throughthe women  
representation policy. The first time, the 
policy of women's representation was 
regulated in the Election Law No. 
12/2003 and implemented in the 2004 
general election. Then the second, in the 
2009 elections, the government imple-
mented the same policy in the Election 
Law no. 10/2008. Then the third time, the 
government declared the Election Law no. 
8/2012 which is implemented in the 2014 
election.The clauses of women's repre-
sentation policy in the three Electoral 
Laws differ from one another and sub-
stantively show an evolutionary change. 
Changes in clauses, especially on (1) 
mechanisms of nomination, (2) placement 
of women candidates in the list, and (3) 
determination of eligible candidates. In 
the Election Law no. 12/2003 and the 
Election Law no. 10/2008 there is no 
clause for every political party, to achieve, 
the quota of 30% of female candidates. 
The clause written in Election Law 
no. 12/2003: ".... may nominate candi-
dates for members of DPR, Provincial 
DPRD and Regency / Municipal DPRD for 
each electoral district ....".Because, the 
sentences written in the clause, do not, 
indicate the order to implement, many 
political parties interpret that, the policy, 
does not have to be implemented. An in-
formant initialed K who became commis-
sioner of Jember District Election Com-
mission for the period of 2004-2009 and 
2009-2014 when asked why not all politi-
cal parties implement the policy, she gave 
information that the factor is because the 
policy clause is not clear.  
As a result,  in the 2004 elections, 
only ten (10) political parties from the 
twenty-four (24) political parties, suc-
ceeded in recruiting candidates to 
30%.The ten parties include the Social 
Democratic Labor Party, the Merdeka Par-
ty, the New Indonesia Democratic Party, 
the Democratic Party, the Justice and Uni-
ty Party of Indonesia, the National Ama-
nah Party, the National Concern Party, the 
Prosperous Justice Party, the Golkar Party 
and the Indonesian Union Party.Fourteen 
other political parties did not reach the 
30% quota. Based on the rules, then to 
fourteen (14) political parties, did not get, 
sanctions.The electoral commission of 
district of Jember only has the authority 
to make public announcements through 
mass media both print and electronic.The 
government hopes, by this announcement 
the public will know there are ten (10) 
political parties that have reached the pol-
icy target and there are fourteen (14) po-
litical parties that do not reach the poli-
cy.Announcements are also communicat-
ed directly through community organiza-
tions.One of them was carried out by elec-
tion commissioners during the regular 
meeting of the Jember Women's Organi-
zation (GOW) during the 2004 election 
campaign.The information provided by 
Election Commissioners complements the 
"women select women" campaign pro-
moted by women activists at the 
time.However, according to informant R, 
the information conveyed by the election 
commissioner herself is not sufficiently 
influential on the acquisition of votes ob-
tained by political parties in the election. 
Success in achieving implementation 
targets has no impact on the acquisition 
of seats. This experience has attracted the 
attention of the policy formulation ac-
tors.The women's representation policy 
clause that was implemented in the 2009 
elections was changed to be more asser-
tive. The clause is contained in the Elec-
tion Law no. 10/2008 of article 53 no 
longer appeals but already mentions the 
30% quota as follows: "the list of candi-
dates referred to in article 52 contains at 
least 30% female representation". 
Although, the policy has been regu-
lated  the percentage of the number of 
women candidates, which must be 
achieved by political parties, in fact not all 
political parties reach the target success-
fully.  As well as the implementation of 
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policies in the 2004 elections, only a few 
political parties have reached the tar-
get.There are 24 political parties have be-
come, contestants, but only 10 reached 
the target. Those are The Social Demo-
cratic Labor Party (PBSD), the Freedom 
Party, the New Indonesian Democratic 
Party (PPIB), the Democratic Party, the 
Justice and Unity Party of Indonesia 
(PKPI), the National Mandate Party 
(PAN), the National Concerned Party 
(PKPB), the Prosperous Justice Party 
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) PKS), Golkar 
Party (Golkar) and United Indonesian 
Party (PSI). 
The policy clause, only mention the 
importance of increasing women candi-
dates  and does not mention the percent-
age that must be achieved by political par-
ties clearly.  Then  in the 2009 election, 
the policy clause has changed and men-
tioned the number of 30%  women legis-
lative candidates, that must  be achieved 
by every political party. 
In Law No. 8/2008, which was im-
plemented in the 2009 elections, article 
55  states: "in the list of prospective can-
didates as referred to in paragraph 1, in 
every 3 candidates there shall be at least 
one candidate. This regulation has an im-
pact that in every 3 (three) candidates, 
women's candidates can be placed in the 
order of 1, or 2 or 3 and so on not only in 
serial numbers 3, 6 and so on. 
There are fifteen (15) political par-
ties that succeeded in reaching the quota 
of 30% of female candidates include: Peo-
ple's Conscience Party (Hanura), Karya 
Peduli Bangsa (PKPB) Party. The National 
People's Concern Party (PKN),  the Sover-
eignty Party (PKS), the Regional Unity 
Party (PPD), the Democratic Reform Party 
(PDP), the Working Party for Develop-
ment (PKB), the Indonesian Democratic 
Enforcement Party (PPDI), Golkar Party, 
Prosperous Peace Party (PDS),  Indone-
sian National Bull Populist Party  
(PNBKI), National Awakening Party of 
Ulama (PKNU). 
The general election commission 
adds KPU Regulation No. 7/2013 with  
sanctions   for political parties, which, 
have failed in achieving the target of 30%. 
These  sanctions are effective in improv-
ing the performance of political parties 
when implementing policies. All political 
parties that become electoral contestants 
reach the target of 30%. The Democratic 
Party reached 44%, followed by the Pros-
perous Justice Party by 39%, and the Jus-
tice and Peduli Indonesia Party (PKPI) of 
38.1%.The average number of policy im-
plementation targets per political party is 
36.9%. 
Regulation of the General Election 
Commission (PKPU) No 7/2013 
Sanctions in PKPU No. 7/2013 get 
criticized, because the clause is contrary 
to the Election Law no 8/2012. The clause 
in the Election Law No.  8/2012 especially 
in articles, number 53, 55 and 56, does 
not mention any sanctions for political 
parties that do not reach the target of 
30%. 
Reaction came from several officials. 
One of them is a member of Commission 
II of DPR RI. As quoted in the Sin-
donews.com, on April 10, 2013,   that 
PKPU No.7 / 2013 must be immediately 
revised because it contradicts  with the 
spirit of UU Pemilu No.8 / 2012. It further 
said that the KPU has caused new-style of 
discrimination because it imposes a 
threat of not involving a political party in 
a diagonal if the representation of women 
in the 30 % list of candidates (DCS) is not 
achieved.  
Another response came from the 
UIN Syarif Hidayatullah scientist, Saleh 
Dauly, who said that the 30% quota of 
women representation as a legislative 
candidate must be fulfilled by political 
parties has triggered the liberalization in 
politics in Indonesia. According to him, 
the clause of sanctions in PKPU No. 
7/2013  is unfair to male candidates.  
The Electoral Commision (KPU) was 
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also criticized by the Election Supervisory 
Board (Bawaslu). According to Bawaslu,  
KPU has exceeded its authority. Because 
in the Election Law No. 8/2012 there is a 
clause stating that if a political party can 
not achieve 30% quota then the incom-
plete file will be returned to the party's 
political committee to be fulfilled.If the 
political party still can not reach the 30% 
quota then the KPU will announce it to the 
public. But the KPU has deliberately vio-
lated this clause, and amended the provi-
sion by directly stating that a political 
party that can not fulfill it is declared an 
ineligible political party.The political par-
ty was immediately sanctioned not to fol-
low the election in the electoral district. 
Although the sanctions clause, which 
is regulated by the election commission 
are criticized this institution and gets sup-
port from various community groups. One 
of them is the Indonesian Women's Coali-
tion (KPI). KPI members from various cit-
ies in Indonesia held a demo, as a form of 
support in  increasing  women's represen-
tation in politics. Fortunately, the number 
 
Table 1. Results of 30% Quota Policy Implementation of Women's Representation  
in Jember, Indonesia  
Source: Secondary data that is processed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. The implementation results of Law No. 8/2012 and PKPU No.7/2013   
in Jember, Indonesia 
Source: Secondary data that is processed  
Year % Female % Male 
2004 120 (22,51) 413 (77,48) 
2009 213 (28,21) 542 (71,78) 
2014 212 (36,69) 362 (63,06) 
No Political 
party 
Number of female 
candidates 
% Number of male 
candidates 
% Total 
1. Nasdem 17 34 33 66 50 
2. PKB 16 35 30 65 49 
3. PKS 19 39 30 61 49 
4. PDIP 15 36,5 26 64,5 41 
5. Golkar 19 38 31 62 50 
6. Gerindra 17 34 33 66 50 
7. Demokrat 22 44 28 56 50 
8. PAN 18 37 31 63 49 
9. PPP 18 37,5 30 62,5 48 
10. Hanura 18 36 32 64 50 
11. PBB 17 34,7 32 65,3 49 
12. PKPI 16 38,1 26 61,9 42 
  Jumlah 212 36,69 362 63,06 574 
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that has supported the KPU more than 
those who have criticized it. Then the 
people who have criticized also have not 
brought their criticism to the court. That 
is why  they have no legal power to cancel 
PKPU No. 7/2013. Therefore, what has 
been criticized has no effect on the behav-
ior of political parties. They continue to 
implement the policy, and achieve the tar-
get of 30% quota of women representa-
tion as candidates. Presumably, this is the 
cause of the increasing number of politi-
cal parties, which implements the policy. 
As shown in Table 1, the increase of polit-
ical parties in implementing the policy 
affects the number of women who be-
come legislative candidates.  
Table 1 shows the success of the pol-
icy, in achieving  the target of 30% of fe-
male candidates. The data in 2004 
showed, when the policy was unclear, and 
only requested, to all political parties, to 
implement the policy, but without clear 
regulatory rules, only 22.51%, women 
candidates were recruited. Whereas in 
the election year of 2009, when the wom-
en's representation policy stated that 
30% of women candidates had to be 
reached by political parties, but the policy 
did not regulate the sanction clause, the 
target achieved was not up to 30%, as 
regulated, and only reached an average of 
28.21%. But when the implemented poli-
cy regulates sanctions for political parties 
that do not achieve targets in each elec-
toral area, the targets are successfully 
achieved by political parties. Percentage 
of achievements of each political party is 
greater than the minimum targeted. In 
table 2 has been listed, the percentage of 
each political party. 
Based on table 2, there are three po-
litical parties that achieve the highest 
ranking: Democratic Party (44%), PKS 
(39%) and PKPI (38.1%). The data in ta-
ble 2 shows that policy sanctions have be-
come coercive forces for policy imple-
menters, to achieve, the targets of the pol-
icy.  Another undeniable factor is that the 
political parties are those participating in 
the election, with one common purpose; 
to win the election.  But the requirement 
to be an election contestant is, reaching 
the target of 30%, women candidates in 
every electoral area. If  it fails, then the 
political party will get sanction from the 
election commission.  Sanctions from the 
Election Commission, are excluded, from 
the list of contestants in the electoral dis-
tricts, which do not reach the 30% target. 
So the sanctions clause that has been 
regulated in PKPU No. 7/2013 is a kind of 
guidance for political parties, to be careful 
when implementing policies. The clause 
of sanctions, in PKPU No. 7/2013, has  an 
effect on the behavior of political parties, 
when recruiting women candidates.  In 
the 2014 election, all  political parties  
which registered as the 2014 election 
contestant are trying to reach the target 
of 30%. This situation was different in the 
elections of 2004 and 2009, when the 
election commission did not regulate 
sanctions. In the two periods of election, 
2004 and 2009, the performance of politi-
cal parties in implementing the policy was 
not optimum.  
This study, proves, that the behavior 
of political parties in recruiting candi-
dates for legislative members can be im-
proved, if the policy which is implement-
ed, contains a clause of sanctions. This 
finding is in line with Kang's opinion.The 
policy design determines the behavior of 
actors in implementing  policies (Kang, 
2013). 
Post-Implementation Policy Verifica-
tion 
The  twelve political parties that 
have implemented the policy, are verified 
by the election commission. Verification 
includes candidate documents and all 
matters relating to candidacy in the 2014 
election. The verification result is be-
comes a quality assurance for the quality 
of the candidate. This verification was 
done from 23 April 2013 until 6 May 
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2013, following the registration done by 
the political parties.  The first step is to 
check the completeness of the require-
ment files for the candidacy of legisla-
tives, as regulated in Law of Election No. 
8/2012. Other than the aforementioned 
files, other data observed by the commit-
tee is the status of every candidate. Any 
candidate involved in law cases would not 
pass this process. Verification of candi-
date documents, which have been regis-
tered as temporary candidates, are strict.  
But if during the document verification 
process, has been found, the data indicat-
ing, a candidate, who is involved in a legal 
case, then the candidate will be canceled.  
The verification was conducted fol-
lowing the applicable schedule, particu-
larly from 9 to 22 August 2013 and an-
nounced to public through local newspa-
pers on 23 to 25 August tahun 2013. The 
verification results are then submitted to 
political parties. Furthermore, the candi-
dates, who have been verified, then re-
ported in the local newspaper "Radar 
Jember" and the local TV “Jember TV 
(JTV)” to get a response from the public. If 
any public object to the candidate, the 
candidate may fail to be nominated. Can-
didates fail not only because of the public 
response but also because of the follow-
ing aspects: firstly, the candidate has died, 
second, the candidate has been resigns, 
and  third candidate had legal problems, 
and was found guilty. But in this study, it 
was found, one case, that the candidate 
resign from a party, and moved to anoth-
er party. Two informants with an LS and 
LN has resigned from their each  previous 
party, and moved to another party. LN  in 
the election of 2009 is an incumbent of 
PKS. Then LS  is an incumbent  of Demo-
cratic Party.  Both of them declared their 
resignation from their previous parties 
and moved into  PAN.  
The phenomenon of removing these 
two incumbents, to the Democratic Party, 
is not a serious problem, for their previ-
ous party as long as  they complete their 
administrative requirements as PAN can-
didates. 
Like other candidates, LN and LS 
were also verified by the Election Com-
mittee of Jember. Following the adminis-
trative verification, the committee ob-
tained that of all the data of the candi-
dates included in the temporary list of 
candidates registered by the political par-
ties, only 10% had complete documents. 
While the rest 90% had not met the re-
quirements.     
Then to those who had not met the 
requirements, the committee gave addi-
tional time for completing them from 9 
May to 22 May 2013. Based on the elec-
tion commission decision letter No. 315/
KPU/V/2013, political parties are allowed 
to make amelioration, addition, improve-
ment, and replacement/substitution of 
the previously registered candidates, in-
cluding making changes in the ordering 
number or constituency. Such replace-
ment or substitution should be recorded 
in the change on the Model Form of BA 
and BB until BB 11, regarding the re-
placed or substituted candidates. 
In addition to the incomplete docu-
ments, the election committee found that 
not all of the participating political parties 
met the requirement of delegating 50 can-
didates, at the least, for the temporary list, 
as regulated by the law. For example, PKB 
only registered 48 candidates, while PDIP 
registered 47 candidates.  Meanwhile, 
seven of the registered candidates did not 
meet the requirements; six of which were 
delegated by PPP and the other one was 
delegated by PBB. Of the six candidates of 
PPP, four of which were female. Yet, fol-
lowing the applicable law, the corre-
sponding party still could replace them 
with other women representatives; there-
fore the 30% quota could have been 
achieved. Meanwhile, the other three fail-
ing candidates were male, in that the cor-
responding political parties were not al-
lowed to replace them with other candi-
dates. Counting the failing candidates, the 
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total candidates who passed were 576 
people. However, one of them declared 
his resignation, making the total of the 
passing candidates decreased to 575 peo-
ple. Finally, the result of the verification 
process was delivered to all participating 
political parties on 7 to 8 May 2013. 
Upon the second completion of all 
documents, the next process was done, 
that is to announce to the mass media 
(Radar Jember). This process took about 
two weeks to obtain enough responses 
from the society. Fortunately, until the 
end of the verification period, no objec-
tion was received by the committee on all 
women candidates listed in the tempo-
rary list. For this, the election committee 
went on to switching the status of the can-
didates in the temporary list to the fixed 
list of candidates.  
The whole mechanism of adminis-
trative and factual verification was done 
by the election committee of Jember in 
accordance with the applicable regula-
tions. Even better, the bureaucracy imple-
mented by the committee of Jember had 
been followed diligently by every political 
party that participated in the election of 
2014. Although initially the political par-
ties seemed to be bothered about imple-
menting the policy, they performed every 
stage of the process successfully. This 
phenomenon indicates that the success in 
implementing a policy can possibly be op-
timized by implementing a distinct policy 
clause which is coupled with sanctions, as 
well as a distinct verification.  
The  result of verification  would be-
come an assurance of the party’s adminis-
trative qualification that it is in accord-
ance with the Law of Election No. 8/2012 
and PKPU No. 7/2013. The result of verifi-
cation indicates that some of the parties 
failed to meet the predetermined require-
ments, therefore required improvement. 
This could happen because the docu-
ments to be prepared by the women rep-
resentatives are abundant, while the time 
provided to prepare them all is limited; 
therefore, it just stands to reason that 
some of the required documents were not 
prepared yet. Despite this, the attempt of 
every political party to comply with the 
policy deserves appreciation. Their com-
pliance to the policy is indicated in the 
increase of women representatives, that it 
is against the findings by Bjarnegard, stat-
ing that the regulation is incapable of in-
creasing the elected women representa-
tives (Bjarnegard & Kenny, 2016). But 
who made the decision, whose  determine 
someone to be a candidate is hard to 
know because it is in a secret garden 
(Bjarnegard & Kenny, 2015).  
However, the policy could success-
fully increase the number of women rep-
resentatives only if it is completed with 
distinct sanctions, as written in PKPU No. 
7/2013. Yet, these sanctions are not 
enough; verification is still required to 
assure that the aim of the policy is imple-
mented. Actually, this data like what Pax-
ton has found. The participation of wom-
en in politics will be increased according 
the the rule of the game (Hughes, Paxton, 
& Krook, 2017).  This finding is in line 
with  Gwiazda  (Gwiazda, 2015) ,  that 
women's representation policy will in-
crease the women's political participa-
tion. It’s a kind  of fast tarct for  women to 
be candidates.  
Administratively, the aforemen-
tioned phase is categorized as a phase for 
the political parties to implement the 
women representation policy, as regulat-
ed in the Law of Election No. 8/2012 and 
PKPU No. 7/2013. This phase was started 
by holding a coordinating assembly by the  
Election Committee of Jember. One of its 
purposes is to uniform all the visions and 
missions of the participating political par-
ties regarding the election conduct. Fur-
thermore, the assembly was held in pur-
pose of socializing all applicable regula-
tions for the election days, including ways 
to implement the women representation 
policy and achieving the 30% quota in 
every constituency.  
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It is vital to have holistic compre-
hension towards the two policies, because 
the women representation policy as im-
plemented in the election of 2014 is dif-
ferent from that implemented in the elec-
tion of 2004 and 2009. In its implementa-
tion in 2004 and 2009, the government 
did not enact the sanctions for any politi-
cal parties that failed to reach the 30% 
quota. More changes were implemented 
during the election of 2014. The govern-
ment started to enact serious sanctions. 
Should a political party fail to reach the 
30% quota of women representatives in a 
certain constituency, it is not allowed to 
participate in the election there. During 
the socialization, the election committee 
of Jember provided some technical guid-
ance regarding the policy in order to help 
all political parties to reach the designat-
ed target.  
The aforementioned target for every 
constituency is an obligatory target for 
every political party. Despite this common 
target, every party applies different crite-
ria for recruiting a candidate. It would 
hinge on the vision and mission of the 
party.  
While attempting to reach the 30% 
quota, the political parties could not avoid 
the possibility that cadres of different 
parties join their parties. One of the appli-
cable requirements is to propose a resig-
nation letter by the cadre to the board of 
the previous party. Following it, the new 
party would indicate his/her moving in by 
giving a member card, thus the movement 
is legal.  
A moving cadre from a political par-
ty to another must be under several fac-
tors, some of which are the previous par-
ty’s failure to pass the electoral threshold, 
and the absence of harmony between the 
cadre’s idealism and the party’s; there-
fore, moving to a different party would be 
wise. Although the party has lost a cadre 
due to her movement to another party, no 
objection from the previous candidate 
party, which is addressed to the new par-
ty of candidates. Legislation, does not pro-
hibit a candidate who moves to another 
political party. 
Achieving the Target of Women Repre-
sentation Policy 
The target of 30% of women candi-
dates is not easily realized by political 
parties. Political parties are still difficult, 
in implementing the policy. Women ca-
dres of political parties are limited in 
number. Even if political parties have 
women resources, the patriarchal culture 
of society is still a barrier to women's 
movement (Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras, & 
Iyer, 2017).  
On the other hand, every political 
party is a contestant of the election which 
aims to be  the winner, making them ap-
ply more pragmatic requirements when 
recruiting the candidates. Some put the 
criteria of candidates in their internal  
policy, which would be used when they  
select women. Actually  their main target 
is their own cadre. Should this element 
not always adequately  their  targets, so 
the political party would recruit the non-
cadres and sympathizers. In this matter, 
the percentage of candidates taken from 
the cadre element is different from the 
other elements. Even a party implement-
ed 10% of non-cadres of all candidates. 
This process of selection involves the 
board and the party winning team.   
CONCLUSION 
Since the signing of agreement on 
the International Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) on 18 Decem-
ber 1979 and its implementation on Sep-
tember 3, 1981 and the holding of Beijing 
Declaration, and Platform for Action in 
1995, the Indonesian government is try-
ing to implement it through the women  
representation policy. The policy of wom-
en representation was regulated in the 
Law of Election No. 12/2003 and imple-
mented in the election of 2004. In the 
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2009 election period, the policy of wom-
en's representation that was implement-
ed was regulated in the Election Law no. 
10/2008. While the policy of women rep-
resentation which is implemented in elec-
tion period of 2014, regulated in the Elec-
tion Law no. 12/2012.  The election com-
mission makes an interpretation of the 
policy and the results are regulated in 
PKPU NO. 7/2013. The result of the inter-
pretation is a decision that regulates sanc-
tions for political parties that fail to 
achieve the target of 30%. 
Women's representation policies 
that had been implemented, during the 
2004 and 2009 elections, were weak and 
powerless, forcing all political parties to 
implement the policy. But in the election 
period of 2014, the implementation of 
women's representation policy, which, 
regulated by the Election Law no. 8/2012 
has been completed by a sanction clause, 
which is regulated in PKPU No. 72013. In 
this periode, women's representation pol-
icy has the power to force political parties 
to achieve the target of 30% of women 
candidates. The results of policy imple-
mentation have effectively increased 
women's political participation as candi-
dates. Therefore this study, has rejected, 
the findings of Cornwall (2017), O’Brien & 
Rickne (2016), Ndirangu, Onkware, & 
Chitere (2017). Patriarchal culture in so-
ciety, is not a barrier, for women's politi-
cal participation as candidates. Although, 
implementing the quota policy is still an 
early stage. Women, who have been suc-
cessfully recruited and have become can-
didates, must still be empowered (Krook, 
2016). 
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